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Distributional effects of direct payments in Switzerland 
El Benni, N., Mann, S. and Lehmann, B.  
 
Abstract 
The switch from market-support to direct payments in Switzerland had impacts on the income 
distribution among farmers. In this paper, the distributional effect of the switch as a whole and 
of the different kinds of direct payments are elaborated through a presentation of different 
decomposed Gini coefficients. Although the income distribution in Swiss Agriculture is still 
more equal than in most other countries, the Gini coefficient has risen from 0.27 in 1990 to 0.38 
in 2009 and is by now strongly dependent on the composition of direct payments. Off-farm 
income and direct payments decrease, while market income increases income inequality.  
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1.  INTRODUCTION  
The analysis of the effects of different income sources on income distribution within the 
farm population has received little attention so far. Particularly research about the impact of 
specific direct payment programs on income inequality is scarce (e.g. Keeney, 2000, Schmid et 
al., 2006). However, most direct payment instruments within agricultural policy have at least 
partially  the  objective  of  income  redistribution  towards  the  neediest  parts  of  the  farming 
population (Mann, 2005). Therefore, the goal of this paper is to measure the effect of Swiss 
agricultural policy reforms on the distribution of income within the farm population. By using 
FADN data from 1990 to 2009, at first, the effect of direct payments in general on household 
income is analysed. Secondly, a more specific analysis is undertaken to measure the effect of 
several direct payment programmes on farm income distribution. The results can be used by 
policy makers to examine the distributional effects of past as well as proposed policy changes.   
A pattern that was found from the literature is that farms with high incomes tend to get 
more  direct  payments  than  low-income  farms,  and  that  direct  payments  can  reduce  overall 
income inequality. For instance, Keeney (2000) found that due to an increasing share of support 
payments on total farm income, Irish farm income inequality decreased between 1991 and 1996 
(pre- to post-MacSharry reform). Whereas programs that target farmers in less favoured areas 
reduced income inequality, per hectare arable payments support mainly farmers with already 
higher incomes. By comparing pre-support with post-support Scottish farm income, Allanson 
(2005) shows that the measures of the MacSharry reform progressively support farmers with 
negative  or  low  pre-support  incomes.  Schmid  et  al.  (2006)  show  that  less-favoured  area 
payments have had only a minor effect on absolute income inequality in Austria, but that direct 
payments and agri-environmental payments increased absolute income inequality. Results of 
Witzke  and  Noleppa  (2007)  show  that  direct  payments  significantly  contribute  to  income 
inequality in German agriculture.  Ancona - 122
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This  paper  is  structured  as  follows.  In  section  2  the  main  developments  of  Swiss 
agricultural policy between 1990 and 2009 are described. The data and methods used in this 
paper are presented in the 3
rd and 4
th section. In the 5
th section the static and dynamic effects of 
agricultural policy reforms on household income distribution are explored as well as the effects 
of  different  direct  payments  on  the  farm  income  distribution.  The  analyses  investigate  the 
hypothesis that changes in income inequality can be attributed to agricultural policy reforms. 
Section 6 summarizes and discusses the results and is followed by the conclusion section. 
2.  DIRECT PAYMENTS AND THE AGRICULTURAL POLICY REFORM IN SWITZERLAND  
Roughly two main steps within the reform process of Swiss agricultural policy can be 
distinguished, the first being in 1992 and the second in 1999. With each change, market support 
was  reduced  and  farm-level  based  subsidies  were  introduced  in  compensation.  Pre-reform 
subsidies that were already available to farmers prior to 1992 included payments provided per 
farm household that aimed to stabilize farm income. Support in the frame of these payments 
ended in the late 1990s. With the first policy reform in 1992, decoupled direct payments were 
introduced. Swiss farmers could voluntarily apply to agri-environmental schemes that aim to 
promote  environmental-friendly  production  systems.  With  the  next  reform  cycle  starting  in 
1999 a new direct payment system was introduced that divides support payments into general 
and  ecological  direct  payments.  General  direct  payments  are  based  on  a  cross-compliance 
approach
1. Farmers had to comply with baseline criteria regarding environmental and animal 
friendly  production,  with  the  most  restrictive  being  the  set-aside  of  seven  percent  of  their 
farmland  as  ecological  compensatory  area  (Mann,  2003).  As  previously,  farmers  can  apply 
voluntarily to ecological direct payment programs. Since 1999, no considerable changes in the 
direct payment system were made. One exception is the introduction of a new performance-
oriented  ecological  direct  payment  program  in  2001,  aiming  to  enhance  and  increase  the 
biodiversity  on  cultural  land.  Nowadays,  general  direct  payments  constitute  most  of  the 
financial support (79% in 2009) and include animal unit and area based payments to farmers in 
the valley regions and additional payments for farmers producing under adverse production 
conditions in the hilly and mountainous regions. Ecological direct payments include payments 
for extensive crop production, ecological compensation areas, and organic farming payments. 
Furthermore,  two  animal  welfare  programs  are  available
2.  Beside  direct  payments,  the 
production of oil seeds, grain legumes, fibre crops, potato seed, maize and fodder plants are 
supported by arable payments. While these payments were adapted over the last two decades, 
they are paid with the aim to enrich crop rotation and for food security reasons. This support 
measure falls under the aforementioned cross compliance condition as well. 
                                                       
 
 
1.    While formally, farmers can voluntary apply to general direct payments, the high adoption rate of almost 100% 
shows, that in practical terms farm operations can hardly survive without governmental support. 
2.    For more details on the direct payment system in Switzerland see e.g. Curry and Stucki (1997), El Benni and 
Lehmann (2010), and Mann (2003). Ancona - 122
nd EAAE Seminar 
"Evidence-Based Agricultural and Rural Policy Making” 
Page 3 of 17 
3.  DATA  
Farm level income data of the Swiss National Farm accounting Network (FADN) over 
the period 1990 to 2009 are used. Total household income is defined as gross household income 
minus total production costs, labour costs and interest on debt and land and is reconfigured into 
off-farm  income,  income  from  different  direct  payments  and  market  income.  The  latter  is 
calculated as the difference between on-farm income and direct payment income and thus also 
contains subsidies to farmers through government market interventions. For the analyses, the 
sample of FADN farm households is weighted based on the farm size, the farm production 
system, and region
3. Since the dataset contains some extreme values, the 2.5% households at the 
top and bottom end of the total household income distribution were excluded from the analysis.   
4.  METHODOLOGY 
4.1.   Static analysis 
The Gini coefficient of inequality is a commonly used measure in income inequality 
research.  For  non-negative  incomes,  the  Gini  coefficient  measures  the  relative  income 
inequality and ranges between 0 and 1. If household income is totally equal distributed the Gini 
coefficient  equals  0  and  increases  the  more  unequal  the  income  distribution  becomes.  To 
estimate  the  Gini  coefficient,  household  income  Y  is  assumed  to  be  a  random  variable, 
distributed with mean   over the farm population. By sorting household incomes in ascending 
order, giving them a rank and dividing the rank by the number of observations, yields the 
cumulative distribution function F(Y). With the covariance denoted by cov, Stuart (1954) shows 
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To measure the effect of different income sources on aggregated income inequality, the 
Gini decomposition approach of Fei et al. (1978) and Pyatt et al. (1980) extended by Lerman 
and Yitzhaki (1985) is applied. Using this method, total household income is defined as the sum 
of incomes from k different sources Yk with F(Yk) denoting the cumulative distribution function 
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3.    The methodology of sample selection and details of weighting are presented in FAT (2000). Ancona - 122
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The  Gini  correlation  Rk  ranges  between  -1  and  +1  and  is  defined  as  the  covariance 
between the kth component income and the cumulative distribution of total income, divided by 
the covariance between the kth component income with its own cumulative distribution (Pyatt et 
al., 1980). If the income of the kth income source increases (decreases) with increasing total 
income,  Rk  is  positive  (negative),  and  if  Rk  equals  0  the  income  source  is  a  constant  not 
contributing to total income inequality. Gk is the Gini coefficient of the kth income source, 
showing how income from the specific income source is distributed within the population. The 
share  of  the  kth  income  source  on  total  income  is  given  by  Sk.  Rk  times  Gk  yields  the 
concentration ratio or Pseudo-Gini coefficient Ck. It measures how income from each source is 
transferred across a population ranked with respect to the level of total income received:  
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The concentration ratio is 0 if all income groups receive an equal amount of income of the 
given  income  component  (Pyatt  et  al.,  1980), is  negative  if income  from  a  specific  source 
accrues mainly to the households in the lower tail of the distribution of total income, and is 
positive, if richer households receive a large proportion of the income from the specific income 
component. A concentration ratio that is larger than the Gini coefficient of aggregate income 
proves that the income component in question has had an unequalising effect on the observed 
aggregate income distribution (Keeney, 2000).  
To measure the effect of a specific income component on aggregated income inequality 
the Gini elasticity is calculated as proposed by Lerman and Yithzaki (1985). The Gini elasticity 
gives information on how the income distribution would change with a marginal percentage 
change in the mean income of the specific income component. By assuming that the internal 
ratio  between total income  distribution  and  income  source remains  undisturbed,  the  rate  of 





















h   (4) 
The income source elasticity  k h  is greater (lower) than 1 if amounts received under the 
specific  policy  program  (income  component)  raise  more  (less)  than  proportional  to  total 
household income. In case of unit elasticity, the distribution of income from a particular income 
source is proportional to the distribution of total income, and thus, the concentration coefficient 
and Gini coefficients coincide (Keeney, 2000, Podder, 1995).  
In the presence of negative incomes the here presented Gini coefficient may exceed unity 
and the estimates of the elasticities are analytically correct but biased upwards (Boisvert and 
Ranney, 1990). Even if methods exist to estimate Gini coefficients that account for negative 
incomes  (Chen  et  al.,  1982)  these  coefficients  cannot  be  decomposed  by  income  source 
(Boisvert and Ranney, 1990) and their interpretation is difficult (van de Ven, 2001). Hence, by Ancona - 122
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using the here presented Gini decomposition approach, the marginal effects of different income 
components on income inequality can be biased upwards. Nevertheless, the qualitative policy 
implications remain by choosing this approach (Boisvert and Ranney, 1990).     
 
4.2. Dynamic analysis 
To analyse the dynamic effects of agricultural policy changes on income inequality, the 
approach of Podder and Chatterjee (2002) is used. Therefore the change of the Gini coefficient 
over time is divided into a share effect (SE) and a concentration effect (CE): 
∆Gt ≈ SE + CE  (5) 
The change in the aggregated Gini coefficient from period t-1 to period t is given by   
∆Gt = Gt – Gt-1. Changes in the Gini coefficient can be attributed to a change in the share of the 
kth income component in total income ∆St = Sk,t – Sk,t-1 and to the change in the concentration 
coefficient between period t-1 and t, namely ∆Ck,t = Ck,t – Ck,t-1. The share effect SE shows, how 
a change in the share of a specific income component affect the change in the overall Gini. In 
contrast,  the  concentration  effect  CE  shows,  how  the  change  in  the  distribution  of  source 
incomes over the ranges of total income, affect the change of the Gini coefficient. The SE can 
be measured with respect to the base period or with respect to the terminal period concentration 
coefficient which would lead to a different result. The same is true for the concentration effect. 


































Hence, the share effect SE of all income components is approximated by the sum of the 
changes in the shares of the different income components from one year to another weighted by 
their average changes in the concentration coefficient over the same time period (and vice versa 
for the concentration effect).  
5.  RESULTS 
In this section the results of the static and dynamic analyses for total household income 
inequality separated into off-farm income, market, and direct payment income are presented. In 
a second step, the results of the static and dynamic effects of different direct payments on farm 
income inequality are shown.  
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5.1.  The effect of agricultural policy reform onal household income 
inequality 
Static analysis 
The hypothesis investigated in this section is that changes in total household income 
inequality can be attributed to agricultural policy reforms, i.e. the change from market support 
to direct payments. Table 1 shows the share of total household income, off-farm income, and 
income from the market and direct payments by selected total household income decile for the 
years 1990, 1995, 2001 and 2009. These years were chosen to represent pre-reform (1990), first 
reform (1995), second reform (2001) and the current (2009) situation. The average share of total 
household  income  received  by  households  in  the  10th  decile  (i.e.  the  households  with  the 
highest incomes) is about 18%, while the share received by the 1st decile (i.e. the households 
with the lowest incomes) is about 5%. Farms with higher household incomes generate more 
income  from  off-farm  work  than  low  income  farms.  Market  income  is  highly  unequally 
distributed  within  the  farm  population.  Due  to  negative  market  incomes  generated  by 
households in the lower (and middle) income decile this inequality strongly increases over time. 
The distribution of income from direct payments over total household income decile reveals 
some interesting changes over time. While in 1990 households in the lower income decile were 
mainly  supported  by  direct  payments,  in  2009  households  within  the  higher  income  decile 
received more direct payments.  
 
Table 1: Income shares of different income sources by deciles of total household income 
Total household income deciles  Year  Income (source) 
1st  3rd  5th  8th  10th 
Mean (CHF)  Sample size 
(Pop. size) 
1990  Household income  4.8  7.2  8.9  12.2  18.0  78918 
    Off-farm income  6.2  8.7  9.0  10.0  14.0  13579 
    Market income  2.8  6.0  8.5  13.4  21.2  54466 
    Direct payments  12.9  11.4  10.8  8.5  7.3  10873 
4086 
(60318) 
1995  Household income  3.8  7.0  9.0  12.6  17.9  62313 
    Off-farm income  4.6  7.7  10.7  12.0  14.8  16706 
    Market income  -6.7  2.1  5.8  17.8  33.0  16832 
    Direct payments  9.4  9.6  9.9  9.9  10.9  28775 
4324 
(57786) 
2001  Household income  4.1  7.1  9.0  12.5  17.8  69885 
    Off-farm income  6.0  6.8  9.4  12.0  13.4  18532 
    Market income  -25.1  -2.9  4.9  22.7  58.1  8535 
    Direct payments  9.1  9.2  9.6  10.7  11.8  42819 
2909 
(50613) 
2009  Household income  3.7  6.8  9.0  12.6  18.5  85416 
    Off-farm income  5.2  8.4  10.4  12.0  13.0  26354 
    Market income  -216.3  -128.8  -48.2  93.9  418.8  1309 
    Direct payments  8.0  9.2  9.6  11.1  12.1  57753 
3199 
(45520) 
Source: own elaboration 
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Table 2 shows the decomposition results for total household income inequality calculated 
according to equations 1 to 4. Obviously, direct payments became the most important income 
source for farmers after the agricultural policy reform in 1992. The Gini coefficients Gk show, 
that total household income inequality increased by 14% between 1990 and 2009. In the same 
time  period  off-farm  income  decreased  by  10% and  income  from  direct  payments  by  33% 
respectively, while market income inequality strongly increased
4. The concentration coefficients 
Ck show that off-farm income is slightly unequally distributed to farmers with higher incomes. 
The  same  is  true  for  market  income.  As  already  suggested  by  the  decile  analysis,  direct 
payments supported low-income farmers in 1990 but high-income farmers after the agricultural 
reform. The marginal effects of the different income components on total income inequality are 
shown by the Gini elasticities presented in the last column of Table 2. It shows that the increase 
of off-farm income and income from direct payments would decrease income inequality while 
the opposite is true for market income. For instance, the increase in direct payments of 1% 
would have reduced inequality by 0.22% in 1990, and even by 0.47% in 2009. Hence, direct 
payments have become less redistributive in an absolute perspective, but due to their increased 
importance have contributed increasingly to balance the income distribution among farmers.  
 
Table 2: The effects of agricultural policy reform on household income inequality 
Year  Income  Sk  Gk  Rk  Ck  k h  
1990  Household income  100  0.21  1.00     
     Off-farm income  17.21  0.58  0.18  0.10  -0.09 
     Market income  69.02  0.36  0.83  0.30  0.32 
     Direct payments  13.78  0.43  -0.22  -0.09  -0.22 
1995  Household income  100  0.23  1.00     
     Off-farm income  26.81  0.54  0.30  0.16  -0.08 
     Market income  27.01  0.94  0.70  0.66  0.50 
     Direct payments  46.18  0.28  0.08  0.02  -0.42 
2001  Household income  100  0.22  1.00     
     Off-farm income  26.52  0.55  0.26  0.14  -0.09 
     Market income  12.21  2.09  0.58  1.21  0.54 
     Direct payments  61.27  0.28  0.21  0.06  -0.45 
2009  Household income  100  0.24  1.00     
     Off-farm income  30.85  0.52  0.27  0.14  -0.13 
     Market income  1.53  16.7  0.58  9.65  0.60 
     Direct payments  67.61  0.29  0.24  0.07  -0.47 
Source: own elaboration 
 
                                                       
 
 
4.     Note, that the Gini coefficients of market income exceed unity already in 2001 due to the high share of negative 
incomes.  Hence,  the  marginal  effect  of  market  income  on  the  income  distribution  is  overestimated  but 
analytically correct.  Ancona - 122
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Dynamic analysis 
The dynamic analysis reveals information on whether a change in the share or a change 
in the concentration of a specific income component led to a change in the aggregated Gini 
coefficient. Table 3 shows that household income inequality increased from the per-reform year 
1990 to the post-reform year 1995, then slightly decreased until 2001 and increased again until 
2009. Between 1990 and 1995 the increase in inequality can mainly be attributed to changes in 
market income. On the one hand, the decrease in the share of market income led to an overall 
negative share effect. On the other hand, the increase in the concentration, especially from 
market income but also from the direct payment income, led to an overall positive concentration 
effect. In sum, the increase in the concentration of all income sources to farmers with higher 
income levels led to an increase in household income inequality. Also the decrease in income 
inequality between 1995 and 2001 is mainly a result of changing market conditions. Especially 
the decreasing share of market on total income led to an overall negative share effect which was 
not outweighed by the positive concentration effect. Between 2001 and 2009 household income 
inequality increased again due to an overall positive concentration effects that outweighed the 
negative share effect. This time, especially the increase in the concentration of direct payments 
to richer farmers led to an increase in total household income inequality. Hence, while the 
changes in income inequality over the first and second agricultural reform periods are related to 
changing market conditions direct payments are the driving forces of inequality changes in 
recent years and contributed to an increase in household income inequality.  
 
Table 3: Source of change in total household income inequality 
line    1990-1995  1995-2001  2001-2009 
1  DG Household income  0.0183  -0.0074  0.0164 
2  DS off-farm income  0.0960  -0.0029  0.0434 
3  DC off-farm income  0.0548  -0.0144  -0.0060 
4  SE+CE off-farm income  0.0247  -0.0043  0.0044 
5  DS market income  -0.4200  -0.1480  -0.1068 
6  DC market income  0.3580  0.5540  8.4388 
7  SE+CE market income  -0.0290  -0.0296  -0.0001 
8  DS direct payment income  0.3240  0.1509  0.0634 
9  DC direct payment income  0.1143  0.0380  0.0123 
10  SE+CE direct payment income  0.0226  0.0265  0.0120 
11  ∑SE  -0.2000  -0.1326  -0.5698 
12  ∑CE  0.2183  0.1253  0.5861 
Source: own elaboration 
DG, DS, DC denote the change in the Gini coefficient of total household income, and the change in the share and 
concentration of each income component respectively. SE and CE are calculated according to eq. 7 and 8. 
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5.2.  The effect of different direct payments on farm income inequality 
Static analysis 
Table 4 shows the decomposition results of farm income inequality by means of income 
from different direct payment programs calculated according to eq. 1 to 4
5. In 1990 the share of 
available direct payments on farm income was relatively low but increased after the agricultural 
policy reform in 1992. As early as 1995, area based payments (introduced in 1993) constituted 
19% of total farm income and even more than 40% in 2001 and 2009. Animal unit based 
payments (RAUval and RAUhill) became important income sources for farmers, too. As shown 
by the concentration coefficients Ck, farm household payments (Hhp), and payments given to 
farmers  producing  under  adverse  production  conditions  (Areahill,  RAUhill)  support  mainly 
households  with  low  income  levels.  In  contrast,  all  other  direct  payments  support  mainly 
farmers with high income levels. The Gini elasticities show that an increase of income from 
each of the general direct payment programmes would decrease farm income inequality. For 
instance,  the  increase  of  area  based  payments  for  farmers  producing  in  the  valley  regions 
(Areaval) of 1% would decrease farm income inequality by 0.24%. In contrast, the increase of 
support for animal welfare and ecological programs (ecological compensation area, extensive 
crop production, ecoquality) would not affect the income distribution.  
 
Table 4: The effects of different direct payment programmes on farm income inequality 
  1990  1995  2001  2009 
Gini farm income  0.27  0.33  0.33  0.38 
Direct payment 
programme  Sk  Ck  k h   Sk  Ck  k h   Sk  Ck  k h   Sk  Ck  k h  
Hhp  2.4  -0.14  -0.04  9.8  -0.01  -0.10  -  -  -  -  -  - 
Arable  4.5  0.19  -0.01  2.3  0.23  -0.01  -  -  -  -  -  - 
Areaval  -  -  -  19.0  0.10  -0.13  46.3  0.14  -0.27  41.5  0.16  -0.24 
Areahill  2.7  -0.14  -0.04  4.4  -0.09  -0.06  4.0  -0.07  -0.05  3.6  -0.05  -0.04 
RAUval  -  -  -  -  -  -  8.1  -0.09  -0.10  17.7  0.08  -0.14 
RAUhill  5.3  -0.23  -0.10  9.5  -0.17  -0.14  8.9  -0.15  -0.13  12.3  0.00  -0.12 
AFSS  -  -  -  -  -  -  1.5  0.28  -0.00  2.2  0.26  -0.01 
Regout  -  -  -  0.5  0.15  -0.00  5.0  0.16  -0.03  6.0  0.14  -0.04 
Eco  -  -  -  2.8  0.15  -0.01  4.1  0.14  -0.02  4.0  0.14  -0.03 
Extenso  -  -  -  1.7  0.24  -0.00  1.2  0.22  -0.00  1.0  0.25  -0.00 
Ecoqual  -    -  -  -  -  1.0  0.10  -0.02  4.5  0.11  -0.02 
Source: own elaboration 
Hhp.: Farm household payments (CHF/farm household), Arable: Arable payments (CHF/ha crop land), Areaval: 
Area based payments for farmers producing in the valley regions (CHF/ha), Areahill: Area based payments for 
farmers producing in the hilly and mountainous regions (CHF/ha), RAUval: Roughage animal unit based payments 
                                                       
 
 
5.    Not all direct payment programs available to Swiss farmers could be analysed here, because of the low number of 
observations of some  farm programmes  within the FADN database. Due to space restrictions, the effect of 
market income is not shown in the table but can be obtained from the authors upon request.  Ancona - 122
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for farmers producing in the valley regions (CHF/roughage animal unit), RAUhill: Roughage animal unit based 
payments  for  farmers  producing  in  the  hilly  and  mountainous  regions    (CHF/roughage  animal  unit),  AFSS: 
Particularly animal-friendly stabling systems (per animal unit), Regout: livestock with regular outdoor exercise (per 




As  shown  by  the  first  line  of  table  5  farm  income  inequality  increased  over  time. 
Furthermore, the table shows the effects of different direct payment programmes on changes in 
the Gini coefficient. Direct payments that were available to farmers producing in the hilly and 
mountainous regions in Switzerland in 1990 and 1995 inversely contributed to the increase in 
farm income inequality. This was mainly a result of the concentration of these payments to 
farmers in the lower tail of the income distribution which led to a negative share effect even if 
both, the concentration as well as share of these payments increased (see eq. 6 and 7 for the 
approximation of the SE and CE). In the case of arable payments, its negative contribution to 
the increase in farm income inequality was the result of the decrease in the share of this income 
source  on  farm  income.    Farm  household  payments  positively  contributed  to  the  observed 
increase in inequality which can be attributed to the strong increase in the concentration of this 
income source to farmers with higher income levels.  
Between 1995 and 2001 almost all direct payment programs positively contributed to the 
increase in farm income inequality. In the case of area based payments for valley farmers (line 
8-10), animal unit based payments for livestock with regular outdoor exercise (line 23-25), and 
payments for ecological compensation area (line 26-28) this was mainly the result of an increase 
in the share. In contrast, for area and animal unit based payments for farmers producing under 
adverse production conditions, this was a result of an increase in the concentration to farmers 
with higher income levels. Payments for extensive crop production inversely contributed to the 
increase in farm income inequality due to a decrease in share as well as concentration.  
Also between 2001 and 2009 most of the direct payment programs positively contributed 
to the increase in farm income inequality. For area and animal unit based payments (in the hilly 
and  valley  regions)  and  the  ecological  compensation  area  program  this  was  a  result  of  an 
increase in concentration. In the case of the two animal welfare programmes and the ecoquality 
programme  the  positive  contribution  to  farm  income  inequality  can  be  attributed  to  their 
increasing shares.    
In summary, the  most important change in the direct payment scheme of the policy 
reform in 1992, namely the reduction of arable payments, has had an effect on farm income 
distribution. Furthermore, it can be observed, that in the early period of programme availability, 
changes in the share mainly affect changes in the income distribution. The longer a program is 
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Table 5: Source of change of farm income inequality due to different direct payment programmes 
line    1990-1995  1995-2001  2001-2009 
1  DG farm income  0.0539  0.0001  0.0484 
  Farm household payments (CHF/farm household)        
2  DS   0.0741  -  - 
3  DC   0.1301  -  - 
4  SE+CE   0.0026  -  - 
  Arable payments (CHF/ha crop land)        
5  DS   -0.0224  -  - 
6  DC   0.4380  -  - 
7  SE+CE   -0.0032  -  - 
  Area based payments (valley regions) (CHF/ha)       
8  DS   -  0.2731  -0.0485 
9  DC   -  0.0370  0.0188 
10  SE+CE   -  0.0451  0.0010 
  Area based payments (hilly regions) (CHF/ha)       
11  DS   0.0165  -0.0040  -0.0035 
12  DC   0.0533  0.0167  0.0289 
13  SE+CE   -0.00001  0.0010  0.0013 
  Animal unit based payments (valley regions) (CHF/RAU*)       
14  DS   -  -  0.0958 
15  DC   -  -  0.1725 
16  SE+CE   -  -  0.0220 
  Animal unit based payments (hilly regions) (CHF/RAU*)       
17  DS   0.0420  -0.0060  0.0347 
18  DC   0.0647  0.0163  0.1522 
19  SE+CE  -0.0037  0.0025  0.0134 
  Animal-friendly stabling systems (CHF/animal unit)       
20  DS   -  -  0.0067 
21  DC   -  -  -0.0244 
22  SE+CE   -  -  0.0014 
  Livestock with regular outdoor exercise (CHF/animal unit)       
23  DS   -  0.0450  0.0107 
24  DC   -  0.0060  -0.0164 
25  SE+CE   -  0.0072  0.0007 
  Ecological compensation area (CHF/ha)       
26  DS   -  0.0135  -0.0009 
27  DC   -  -0.0177  0.0070 
28  SE+CE   -  0.0013  0.0002 
  Extensive crop production (CHF/ha)       
29  DS   -  -0.0043  -0.0019 
30  DC   -  -0.0120  0.0295 
31  SE+CE   -  -0.0012  -0.0001 
  Ecoquality (CHF/ha)       
32  DS   -  -  0.0347 
33  DC   -  -  0.0072 
34  SE+CE   -  -  0.0039 
Source: own elaboration 
*RAU: roughage animal unit; DG, DS, DC denote the change in the Gini coefficient of total household income, and 
the change in the share and concentration of each income component respectively. SE and CE are calculated 
according to eq. 7 and 8. 
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6.  SUMMARY AND DISCUSSION 
Compared to other countries, farm income within the Swiss farm population is rather 
equally distributed with Gini coefficients ranging between 0.27 and 0.38 (and between 0.31 and 
0.41 if the dataset is not trimmed). In contrast, Gini coefficients of between 0.63 and 0.55 were 
found for Ireland (Keeney, 2000), and a Gini coefficients of 0.54 was found for Germany (von 
Witzke and Noleppa 2007). This result can be explained by the homogenous structure of Swiss 
agriculture that is based on small family farms with an average size of little more than 17 
hectare (FSO, 2007) and similar capital intensity. Even if structural change took place within 
the last two decades, no large and highly efficient farm operations were developed.  
Between  1990  and  2009,  total  household  income  inequality  only  slightly  increased 
whereas a strong increase in farm income inequality can be observed. This shows that off-farm 
income plays an important role to balance the income distribution among farmers. It also shows 
the increasing dualism in the Swiss agriculture between part-time farmers and full-time farmers. 
The equalizing effect of off-farm income on income distribution was also found for the US 
(Mishra et al., 2009).  
With the change from market support to direct payments, the decline in output prices led 
to an increasing share of households that generate negative market incomes while the share of 
direct  payments  on  farm  income  increased  considerable.  Nowadays,  around  half  of  Swiss 
farmers live with a negative market income, a situation that is unheard of in any other sector. 
The  per  farm  household  payments  of  the  pre-reform  period  supported  mainly  low-income 
farmers  und  were  thus  highly  unequally  distributed  in  themselves.  The  direct  payments 
introduced with the agricultural policy reform in 1992, support farmers over the whole range of 
income levels (i.e. were more equally distributed in themselves) but are more concentrated to 
farmers in the upper tail of the income distribution. Hence, payments that are in one way or 
another related to farm size, such as those introduced in 1992, are also related to farm profits 
(von Witzke and Noleppa, 2007, Schmid et al., 2006). This was also shown by Mann (2006) for 
area based direct payments in Switzerland.  
The results can also be discussed in the light of changing agricultural policy goals. In the 
pre-reform period the main goal of direct payments was to support low income farmers that 
were disadvantaged by adverse production conditions and did not earn a comparable income 
even though market support led to very high price levels. With the agricultural policy reform in 
1992 market support was reduced and direct payments aimed to compensate farmers for income 
losses they face due to decreasing prices. The new agricultural policy was based on per hectare 
and per animal unit payments that were made available to all farmers. To a certain extent, this 
approach conserved the distributional effects of the former policy. As in the case with market 
support, also the support through direct payments advantaged high income farmers. This is 
because input factors (such as land) on the one hand enable farmers to produce more output and 
on the other hand determine the amount of direct payments farmers receive. However, even if 
high-income  farmers  receive  more  direct  payments  than  low-income  farmers,  they  have  an Ancona - 122
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equalizing  effect  on  the  income  distribution.  This  was  also  found  for  Ireland  and  the  US 
(Keeney, 2000, Mishra et al., 2009).  
The analysis shows furthermore, that changes in income inequality over the first (1992) 
and second agricultural reform period (1999) are related to changing market conditions, but that 
direct payments are the driving forces of inequality changes in recent years (i.e. the increase in 
income inequality between 2001 and 2009). This is due to the increasing importance of direct 
payments as income source but also due to its increasing concentration to high-income farmers. 
It shows furthermore, that the price effect of market support had have a strong impact on the 
income distribution among farmers.   
The detailed analysis reveals that the increase of income from each of the direct payment 
programs  would  decrease farm  income  inequality.  This is especially  true  for general direct 
payments that make up a high share on farm income. In contrast, the increase of income from 
animal  welfare  payments  and  ecological  direct  payments  would  hardly  affect  farm  income 
distribution because of their low contribution to total farm income.  
One particular goal of agricultural policy is to support farmers that are faced by adverse 
production  conditions.  Area  and  roughage  animal  unit  based  payments  provided  for  those 
households in fact support low income farmers. Hence, these payments seem to be well targeted 
at  least  when  market  prices  are  decreasing.  Similar  results  were  found  for  Compensatory 
Allowances  (Headage)  in  Ireland  that  also  aim  to  support  farmers  in  areas  facing  natural 
handicaps  (Keeney,  2000).  In  contrast,  arable  payments,  area  based  payments  for  valley 
farmers, animal welfare and ecological direct payments are mainly given to farmers with higher 
incomes. Hence, payments coupled to the farm size support farmers with a lower risk of low 
incomes. Furthermore, farmers with bigger farms can more easily provide environmental goods 
than  very  small  scaled  farms  (Mann,  2006).  The  subscription  to  animal  welfare  measures 
require investments (e.g. for new stabling systems) which might explain that mainly farmers in 
the upper tail of the income distribution are supported by these payments.  
The dynamic analysis shows that area based payments given to farmers in the valley 
regions positively contributed to the increase in the Gini coefficient of farm income. In the early 
period this was the result of the increasing share of this payment on farm income. Over the later 
period this was because of the increase in the concentration of this payment to farmers with 
higher income levels. A similar dynamic can be observed for all payments that are directly or 
indirectly linked to the farm size. In contrast, ecological direct payments and animal welfare 
payments mainly positively contribute to farm income inequality due to their increasing share in 
farm  income.  This  development  is  suggested  to  be  the  result  of  the  adaption  behaviour  of 
farmers to changing market conditions and changes in the direct payment system. This includes 
the optimization of income through direct payments (e.g. the change from crop to livestock 
production) which is the better able the longer the programmes are available. Further analyses 
could therefore focus on the impact of structural change on the income distribution. This would 
give information on whether and to what extent inequality is a direct result of money transfer or 
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7.  CONCLUSION  
The advantage of the Gini decomposition method used in this paper is that marginal 
effects  of  single  income  components  on  total  income  distribution  can  be  calculated. 
Furthermore, it can be shown whether changing shares or changes in the distribution of different 
income  components  within  the  farm  population  led  to  increasing  or  decreasing  income 
inequality  over  time.  However,  as  this  method  assumes  that  incomes  from  all  sources  are 
independent  of  each  other  feedback  effects  are  neglected  even  if  they  might  be  substantial 
(Keeney, 2000). For instance, the contribution of direct payments to the inequality of household 
income can be identified but the incentives of these payments on production are not taken into 
account.  Nevertheless,  this  kind  of  analysis  provides  interesting  information  and  policy 
implications can be drawn. 
In  general,  the here  presented  analysis  shows that governmental support  in  any  way 
influences farm income and income distribution, which should be considered by policy makers. 
This applies in particular in a country like Switzerland where agriculture is highly dependent on 
public support. The strong reliance on direct payments which Swiss farms have developed over 
the last 20 years has not led to a significant change in sectoral inequality altogether. However, 
the change from volume based market support to structural based decoupled direct payments 
increased the responsibility of policy makers regarding the distribution of farm income. This is 
shown by the fact that the increase in farm income inequality within the last decade can mainly 
be attributed to the change in the importance and concentration of direct payments.   
Furthermore, there is now a big gap between farms that manage to earn money on the 
market and farms that lose money by producing food and forage. In cases where income from 
direct payments exceeds the actual amount of farm income earned, negative values remain (that 
represent market income in the current study) and Gini coefficients exceed unity. This creates 
sharpened  methodological  challenges  if  Gini  decomposition  approaches  are  used  (i.e.  how 
negative values are handled). However, the qualitative policy implications remain. Especially 
farming families in the lower income tail cannot survive without direct payments and off-farm 
income. This changes the economic and social character of farming considerably. It also shows 
the  conflict  of  different  policy  objectives  (e.g.  income  goals  and  the  increase  of  the 
competitiveness of Swiss agriculture) as uneconomic farm operations stay in business which 
reduces the release of agricultural land and hampers the restructuring of agriculture.     
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